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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




Plaintiff Paul P. sues on his behalf and on behalf of a 
class of persons who, having been convicted of specified sex 
crimes, are required to comply with N. J. Stat. Ann. S 2c:7- 
1 et seq., known as "Megan's Law," which provides for a 
system of registration and community notification. Named 
as defendants are the Attorney General of New Jersey and 
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numerous County Prosecutors (collectively, the "State 
defendants"). 
 
In a related action, E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d 
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998), this court 
rejected the claims of comparably situated persons that the 
community notification requirements violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United 
States Constitution. That holding of E.B. was predicated on 
the conclusion that the notification required by Megan's 
Law does not constitute punishment. Judge, now Chief 
Judge, Becker dissented to this portion of the holding. The 
E.B. decision also held that "[t]he Due Process Clause . . . 
would be violated by any Tier 2 or Tier 3 notification that 
occurred without a prior opportunity to challenge the 
registrant's classification and notification plan in a hearing 
at which the prosecutor has the burden of persuasion and 
must prove her case by clear and convincing evidence." Id. 
at 1111. 
 
In this case, plaintiffs raise a challenge to Megan's Law 
that they claim is different from that considered in E.B. 
They argue that the statutory requirement that the class 
members provide extensive information to local law 
enforcement personnel, including each registrant's current 
biographical data, physical description, home address, 
place of employment, schooling, and a description and 
license plate number of the registrant's vehicle, and the 
subsequent community notification is a violation of their 
constitutionally protected right to privacy. 
 
The statutory scheme is described in detail in E.B., and 
we refer only briefly to the salient details. We explained the 
registration requirements as follows: 
 
       The registrant must provide the following information 
       to the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality 
       in which he resides: name, social security number, age, 
       race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair and eye 
       color, address of legal residence, address of any 
       current temporary legal residence, and date and place 
       of employment. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-4b(1). He must confirm 
       his address every ninety days, notify the municipal law 
       enforcement agency if he moves, and re-register with 
 
                                4 
  
       the law enforcement agency of any new municipality. 
       N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2d to e. 
 
Id. at 1082 (quoting Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 
1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
 
The information provided by the registrant is put into a 
central registry, open to other law enforcement personnel 
but not to public inspection. Law enforcement officials then 
use the data provided to apply a "Risk Assessment Scale," 
a numerical scoring system, to determine the registrant's 
"risk of offense" and the tier in which the registrant should 
be classified. In the case of Tier 1 registrants, notification is 
given only to law enforcement agents "likely to encounter" 
the registrant. Tier 2, or "moderate risk," notification is 
given to law enforcement agents, schools, and community 
organizations "likely to encounter" the registrant. Tier 3, or 
"high risk," notification goes to all members of the public 
"likely to encounter" the registrant. Notifications generally 
contain a warning that the information is confidential and 
should not be disseminated to others, as well as an 
admonition that actions taken against the registrant, such 
as assaults, are illegal. 
 
The prosecutor must provide the registrant with notice of 
the proposed notification. A pre-notification judicial review 
process is available for any registrant who wishes to 
challenge his or her classification. 
 
The plaintiffs are Tier 2 and Tier 3 registrants who have 
been certified as a class and whose offenses were 
committed after the enactment of Megan's Law. When Paul 
P. filed the original complaint on June 16, 1997, alleging 
that the statute violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights of 
privacy and due process, as well as the constitutional 
prohibition against double jeopardy and cruel and unusual 
punishment, E.B. had not yet been decided. This court 
decided E.B. shortly thereafter. The State defendants, 
relying on E.B., moved for summary judgment; plaintiffs 
argued in opposition that E.B. did not dispose of their 
privacy claim and that discovery was required, inter alia, on 
the due process claim. On October 29, 1997, the District 
Court granted the State defendants' motion for summary 
judgment as to all but the plaintiffs' due process claim. See 
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Paul P. v. Verniero, 982 F. Supp. 961 (D.N.J. 1997). At the 
request of the plaintiffs and with the consent of the 
Attorney General, the court certified the order as appealable 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procure 54(b). The court later 
granted summary judgment for the State defendants on the 
due process claim. The plaintiff class limits its appeal to the 
claim that Megan's Law violates its constitutional rights to 
privacy. The State defendants and the United States, which 




The legal foundation for plaintiffs' claim is the Supreme 
Court's recognition that there is "a right of personal 
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy," 
protected by the United States Constitution. Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). This "guarantee of personal 
privacy" covers "only personal rights that can be deemed 
`fundamental' or `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' " 
Id. This privacy right "has some extension to activities 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, and child rearing and education." Id. at 152- 
53 (citations omitted). 
 
Plaintiffs argue that Megan's Law infringes upon their 
constitutionally protected privacy interests in two ways. 
One is by the dissemination of information about them, 
most particularly by disseminating both their home 
addresses and a "compilation of information which would 
otherwise remain `scattered' or `wholly forgotten.' " 
Appellants' Br. at 12. Their other claim is that the 
community notification infringes upon their "privacy 
interests in their most intimate relationships - those with 
their spouses, children, parents, and other family 
members." Appellants' Br. at 12. 
 
Plaintiffs thus seek to invoke the two categories of privacy 
interests identified by the Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe, 
429 U.S. 589 (1977), where the Court stated: "The cases 
sometimes characterized as protecting `privacy' have in fact 
involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters, and another is the interest in independence in 
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making certain kinds of important decisions." Id. at 598- 
600 (footnotes omitted). 
 
The parties dispute the extent to which our decision in 
E.B. is dispositive of the privacy issue before us in this 
case. Plaintiffs contend that no privacy issue was raised, 
briefed, or argued in E.B. and that the discussion in E.B. 
relating to cases on which they rely is dictum. The State 
defendants, on the other hand, regard "[t]he portions of the 
E.B. decision holding that community notification does not 
implicate a fundamental privacy interest and the finding of 
a compelling state interest in protecting the public from 
recidivist sex offenders," as "control[ling] the decision in 
this case." Appellees' Br. at 12. We thus turn to examine 
the E.B. decision. 
 
The privacy issue arose in E.B. during our analysis of 
whether community notification mandated by Megan's Law 
constitutes punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto 
and Double Jeopardy clauses. In that context, we stated 
that the "primary sting from Megan's law notification comes 
by way of injury to what is denoted . . . as reputational 
interests. This includes . . . the myriad of . . . ways in 
which one is treated differently by virtue of being known as 
a potentially dangerous sex offender." E.B., 119 F.3d at 
1102. We then referred to the Supreme Court's holding in 
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), stating: 
 
       Just as Davis sought constitutional protection from the 
       consequences of state disclosure of the fact of his 
       shoplifting arrest and law enforcement's assessment 
       that he was a continuing risk, so registrants seek 
       protection from what may follow disclosure of facts 
       related to their sex offense convictions and the 
       resulting judgment of the state that they are a 
       continuing risk. It follows that, just as the officers' 
       publication of the official act of Davis' arrest did not 
       violate any fundamental privacy right of Davis', neither 
       does New Jersey's publication (through notification) of 
       registrants' convictions and findings of dangerousness 
       implicate any interest of fundamental constitutional 
       magnitude. 
 
E.B., 119 F.3d at 1103. 
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We rejected the contention that dissemination of 
information about criminal activity beyond law enforcement 
personnel is analogous to historical punishments, such as 
the stocks, cages, and scarlet letters. We found instead that 
the dissemination is more like the dissemination of "rap 
sheet" information to regulatory agencies, bar associations, 
prospective employers, and interested members of the 
public that public indictment, public trial, and public 
imposition of sentence necessarily entail. Id. at 1100-01. 
We noted that although the Supreme Court later recognized 
in United States Department of Justice v. Reporter's 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), 
that the dissemination of "rap sheets" implicates a privacy 
interest, the Court there was determining whether a"rap 
sheet" fell under the "privacy interest" protected by an 
exemption to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), not 
that protected by the Constitution. We pointed out that the 
Supreme Court itself made the distinction between the two 
types of privacy interest, and we quoted its statement in 
Reporter's Committee, 489 U.S. at 762 n.13, that "[t]he 
question of the statutory meaning of privacy under the 
FOIA is, of course, not the same as the question . .. 
whether an individual's interest in privacy is protected by 
the Constitution." E.B., 119 F.3d at 1100 n.21. 
 
In this respect, we disagreed with the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey which, in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 83-87, 662 
A.2d 367, 409-11 (1995), had interpreted Reporter's 
Committee to compel the conclusion that a federal 
constitutional right to privacy is implicated by notification. 
See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1103 n.23. Finally, we concluded in 
E.B. that even if a "fundamental right" were implicated, "the 
state's interest here would suffice to justify the 
deprivation." Id. at 1104. 
 
Determining the import of this discussion in E.B. is 
difficult. On the one hand, it has more significance than 
mere dictum, as it was relevant to the holding that Megan's 
Law was not punitive. On the other hand, the discussion 
arose in a context different than it does here; the privacy 
issue was tangential to the determination of the different 
constitutional issues raised. The discussion also focused on 
the dissemination of information -- the fact of "registrants' 
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convictions and findings of dangerousness" -- that is to 
some extent distinct from the portion of the disclosures 
plaintiffs now challenge -- the revelation of their home 
addresses and the compilation of otherwise scattered 
information. Finally, we note that in E.B., we began our 
opinion with the caveat, "The issues before us are difficult 
but relatively narrow. We are not called upon to decide 
whether Megan's Law can constitutionally be applied to one 
who has committed one of the designated sex crimes after 
its enactment." Id. at 1081. 
 
The District Court in this case apparently had little 
difficulty rejecting Paul P.'s privacy claims based on the 
decision in E.B. It stated, "we find that the Third Circuit in 
E.B. did address registrants' rights to privacy and explicitly 
found that community notification does not violate any 
fundamental substantive due process right." Paul P., 982 F. 
Supp. at 966. Nonetheless, the court continued its 
discussion by "assuming the Third Circuit's E.B. analysis 
addressed only the reputational interests of registrants, not 
the interests plaintiffs are now asserting," and it then 
concluded that the registrants' interests in information 
concerning their home address and in compilation of 
information are not within the protected "zones of privacy" 
because the information is public. Id. 
 
We do not agree with the State defendants that our 
decision in E.B. is dispositive of the privacy issue presented 
here, as there seems to be little dispute that this issue 
was not directly presented there. Nonetheless, our 
characterization in E.B. of key cases, such as Reporter's 
Committee and Paul v. Davis, merits considerable deference 
and we are not likely to disagree with our colleagues absent 




In several cases, this court has considered what types of 
information may be protected from disclosure based on a 
privacy interest. In Fraternal Order of Police v. City of 
Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 112-17 (3d Cir. 1987), we 
stated that "[i]n determining whether information is entitled 
to privacy protection, we have looked at whether it is within 
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an individual's reasonable expectations of confidentiality. 
The more intimate or personal the information, the more 
justified is the expectation that it will not be subject to 
public scrutiny." Id. at 112-13. 
 
Many of the cases in this circuit finding a privacy interest 
in preventing disclosure have concerned medical 
information or medical records. Almost two decades ago, we 
stated in United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 
F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980), "[A]lthough the full measure of the 
constitutional protection of the right to privacy has not yet 
been delineated, . . . [t]here can be no question that an 
employee's medical records, which may contain intimate 
facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of 
materials entitled to privacy protection." Id. at 577. 
Similarly, in Fraternal Order of Police, we held that the 
medical information a police questionnaire sought to elicit 
from employees was entitled to protection against 
disclosure. 812 F.2d at 112-13. In fact, in Doe v. SEPTA, 72 
F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995), we specifically held that medical 
prescription records are "within the ambit of information 
protected by the Constitution." Id. at 1137-38; see also Doe 
v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382-85 (D.N.J. 
1990) (holding that because "[t]he Third Circuit recognizes 
a privacy right in medical records and medical information," 
family members' AIDS status was entitled to protection). 
 
However, the privacy right in record information is not 
limited to medical records. In Nixon v. Administrator of 
General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 455-65 (1977), the Court 
recognized that the President had a protected privacy 
interest in at least some of the 42 million pages of 
documents covered by the Presidential Recordings and 
Materials Preservation Act, and among those protected were 
private communications between the President and his 
family and advisors, as distinguished from the millions of 
records dealing with government business and official 
duties. Similarly, in Fraternal Order of Police, we held that 
police officers and prospective police officers had privacy 
interests in certain financial information sought by a police 
questionnaire, and we noted cases from other courts that 
have so held. See 812 F.2d at 115; see also Plante v. 
Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132-36 (5th Cir. 1978) 
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(considering the constitutionality of financial disclosure 
laws that regulate elected officials); cf. Slayton v. 
Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984) (stating 
that whether plaintiff had a privacy interest in personal 
photographs would depend on whether "he had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the photos"). 
 
Other courts have narrowly interpreted the type of 
information protected. For example, the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit has considered the right to prevent the 
disclosure of private information to be part of the 
constitutional right to privacy only when disclosure would 
"implicate a fundamental liberty interest," such as the 
interest in preserving personal security or bodily integrity. 
Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 683-84 (6th Cir. 1998). In Doe 
v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. 
Ct. 51 (1997), it rejected the contention that adoption 
records are constitutionally confidential. 
 
Even information that is entitled to privacy protection 
may nonetheless be subject to disclosure when the 
government's interest in disclosure is compelling. For 
example, although we stated in Westinghouse that medical 
information is "matter which the individual is ordinarily 
entitled to retain within the `private enclave where he may 
lead a private life,' " 638 F.2d at 577, we also recognized 
that "the right of an individual to control access to her or 
his medical history is not absolute," id. at 578, and that 
there are some governmental interests, such as public 
health or other public concerns, that "may support access 
to facts an individual might otherwise choose to withhold," 
id. We followed that approach in a later case, where we held 
that the medical information requested by a police 
department questionnaire should be disclosed because it 
was directly related to the interest of the police department 
in selecting officers who were physically and mentally 
capable of handling the positions for which they were 
applying. Fraternal Order of Police, 812 F.2d at 114. 
 
Public interest has justified disclosure of other categories 
of information as well. In the same case, we stated that "the 
strong public interest in avoiding corruption among officers 
assigned to a unit designed to perform investigations in 
areas traditionally susceptible to corruption outweighs 
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police officers' limited privacy expectations in the financial 
information sought by the . . . questionnaire." Id. at 116. 
 
Against this background, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit upheld Washington state's version of Megan's 
Law against the claim that it violated the plaintiffs' right to 
privacy. See Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093-94 
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998). 
Significantly, the Washington statute was less pervasive 
than the one before us as it authorized disclosure of only 
the "general vicinity of the offender's residence" and not the 
exact address. Nonetheless, the court's analysis is relevant 
to this case. The court construed the right to privacy to 
"protect only personal information," and noted that most of 
"[t]he information collected and disseminated by the 
Washington statute is already fully available to the public 
and is not constitutionally protected." Id.  at 1094. The 
court permitted disclosure relating to the offender's 
residence and employment, because even if not publicly 
available, such information was not "generally considered 
`private'." Id.; see also Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 
1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (denying a preliminary injunction 
of Michigan's version of Megan's Law because "plaintiffs 
have failed to demonstrate the existence of a legitimate 
privacy interest in preventing compilation and 
dissemination of truthful information that is already, albeit 
less conveniently, a matter of public record"). New York's 
version of Megan's Law has also been sustained, but in an 
opinion that did not consider the privacy issue. Doe v. 
Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. 
Ct. 1066 (1998). 
 
The District Court here concluded that there was no 
privacy interest in the plaintiffs' home addresses, stating 
that "[b]ecause such information is public, plaintiffs' 
privacy interests are not implicated." Paul P., 982 F. Supp. 
at 966. As to the argument based on the "compilation" of 
various information, the court held that "[i]t is of little 
consequence whether this public information is disclosed 
piecemeal or whether it is disclosed in compilation." Id. at 
967. 
 
To the extent that plaintiffs' alleged injury stems from the 
disclosure of their sex offender status, alone or in 
 
                                12 
  
conjunction with other information, the District Court's 
opinion is in line with other cases in this court and 
elsewhere holding specifically that arrest records and 
related information are not protected by a right to privacy. 
See Fraternal Order of Police, 812 F.2d at 117 (holding that 
"arrest records are not entitled to privacy protection" 
because they are public); Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 
(6th Cir.) (holding that "there is no constitutional right to 
privacy in one's criminal record" because "arrest and 
conviction information are matters of public record"), cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 510 (1996). In Trade Waste Management 
Association, Inc. v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1985), 
this court discussed a privacy challenge to a statute 
requiring certain disclosures from applicants for 
environmental permits. We noted the privacy interest 
behind avoidance of disclosure of "personal matter," such 
as "personal medical history," but held that records of 
criminal convictions and pending criminal charges"are by 
definition public," and therefore not protected. Id. at 234. 
 
This issue was also considered in Paul v. Davis, relied on 
heavily in the E.B. opinion. The Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that a police chief who published a flier 
identifying the plaintiff with a photograph as an"active 
shoplifter" violated plaintiff's "right to privacy." 424 U.S. at 
695-96. The Court distinguished cases dealing with 
"matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, and child rearing and education," from 
the claims made by Paul. Id. at 713. The court stated: 
 
       Respondent's claim is far afield from this line of 
       decisions. He claims constitutional protection against 
       the disclosure of the fact of his arrest on a shoplifting 
       charge. His claim is based, not upon any challenge to 
       the State's ability to restrict his freedom of action in a 
       sphere contended to be "private," but instead on a 
       claim that the State may not publicize a record of an 
       official act such as an arrest. None of our substantive 
       privacy decisions hold this or anything like this, and 
       we decline to enlarge them in this manner. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
Plaintiffs argue that Paul v. Davis is inapposite because 
the Court was merely dealing with a reputational interest, 
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and not any of the interests they assert here. It is true that 
in rejecting the argument that there was a liberty interest 
at stake, the Court in Paul v. Davis held that "reputation 
alone" does not invoke the procedural due process 
protections. 424 U.S. at 701. And, we recognize that Paul v. 
Davis preceded the Court's decisions in Whalen and Nixon 
which made further steps in the development of the right of 
privacy. See Slayton, 726 F.2d at 635 (noting possible effect 
of Whalen and Nixon on plaintiff's claim based on 
"disclosure of personal matters rather than mere damage to 
his reputation"). Nonetheless, even if the interests plaintiffs 
assert in preventing the disclosure of private information is 
somewhat different than the reputational interest discussed 
in E.B. and rejected in Paul v. Davis, we cannot simply 
disregard the language of the Supreme Court rejecting any 
privacy interest in information, such as arrests, which is 
the subject of official records. 
 
We are not insensitive to the argument that notification 
implicates plaintiffs' privacy interest by disclosing their 
home addresses. The compilation of home addresses in 
widely available telephone directories might suggest a 
consensus that these addresses are not considered private 
were it not for the fact that a significant number of persons, 
ranging from public officials and performers to just 
ordinary folk, choose to list their telephones privately, 
because they regard their home addresses to be private 
information. Indeed, their view is supported by decisions 
holding that home addresses are entitled to privacy under 
FOIA, which exempts from disclosure personal files"the 
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. S 552(b)(6). Most of 
the cases addressing this FOIA exemption concern the 
interaction of the Federal Labor Relations Act and the 
claimed need of employees' addresses for bargaining 
purposes. In United States Department of Defense v. FLRA, 
510 U.S. 487 (1994), the Supreme Court held that the 
Privacy Act forbids the disclosure by federal agencies of 
employee addresses to collective bargaining representatives, 
thereby resolving a division among the circuits. Compare 
FLRA v. United States Dep't of Defense, 977 F.2d 545,549 
(11th Cir. 1992) ("[F]requently [home address] information 
is unavailable because the person has made a genuine 
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effort to keep the information private -- by getting an 
unlisted telephone number or asking to be removed from 
mailing lists."), FLRA v. U. S. Dep't of Navy, 966 F.2d 747, 
758-59 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (finding privacy interest in 
names and addresses under FOIA was outweighed by 
union's interest in communication to employees), and 
United States Dep't of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131, 1139 
(3d Cir. 1988) (same), with FLRA v. U. S. Dep't of Treasury, 
Fin. Management Serv., 884 F.2d 1446, 1456 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (barring disclosure). 
 
Plaintiffs' primary argument receives further support 
from the New Jersey Supreme Court holding, relying on 
FOIA cases, that "[t]he fact that plaintiff's home address 
may be publicly available" aside, privacy interests were 
implicated by the disclosure of the home address along with 
the other information. Poritz, 142 N.J. at 83, 662 A.2d at 
409. 
 
Although these cases are not dispositive, see E.B., 119 
F.3d at 1103 n.23, they reflect the general understanding 
that home addresses are entitled to some privacy 
protection, whether or not so required by a statute. We are 
therefore unwilling to hold that absent a statute, a person's 
home address is never entitled to privacy protection. As the 
Court said in Department of Defense, persons "have some 
nontrivial privacy interest in nondisclosure. . . ." 510 U.S. 
at 501. 
 
Accepting therefore the claim by the plaintiffs that there 
is some nontrivial interest in one's home address by 
persons who do not wish it disclosed, we must engage in 
the balancing inquiry repeatedly held appropriate in privacy 
cases. 
 
The nature and significance of the state interest served 
by Megan's Law was considered in E.B. There, we stated 
that the state interest, which we characterized as 
compelling, "would suffice to justify the deprivation even if 
a fundamental right of the registrant's were implicated." 
E.B., 119 F.3d at 1104. We find no reason to disagree. The 
public interest in knowing where prior sex offenders live so 
that susceptible individuals can be appropriately cautioned 
does not differ whether the issue is the registrant's claim 
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under the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses, or is 
the registrant's claim to privacy. Thus, as the District Court 
concluded, the plaintiffs' privacy claim based on disclosure 
of information must fail. Because we find the government's 
interest in preventing sex offenses compelling, we need not 
decide whether the degree of effort needed to assemble 
otherwise available but dispersed information ought to be 
considered as a factor in determining the reasonableness of 




The other argument raised by plaintiffs as part of their 
privacy claim is that community notification infringes upon 
their fundamental interest in family relationships. In 
pressing this argument, which concerns the second type of 
protected interest referred to in Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598- 
600, plaintiffs rely on the precedent of cases such as Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), and Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), which recognize the 
privacy protection accorded "matters relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child 
rearing and education," Paul, 424 U.S. at 713. In E.B., we 
recognized that Megan's Law "impose[s] no restrictions on a 
registrant's ability to live and work in a community," E.B. 
119 F.3d at 1102, but that plaintiffs complain of the law's 
"indirect effects: Actions that members of the community 
may take as a result of learning of the registrant's past, his 
potential danger, and his presence in the community," 
id. Even if we concede, as the District Court did, that "being 
subject to Megan's Law community notification places a 
constitutionally cognizable strain upon familial 
relationships," Paul P., 982 F. Supp. at 967, these indirect 
effects which follow from plaintiffs' commission of a crime 
are too substantially different from the government actions 
at issue in the prior cases to fall within the penumbra of 
constitutional privacy protection. Megan's Law does not 
restrict plaintiffs' freedom of action with respect to their 
families and therefore does not intrude upon the aspect of 
the right to privacy that protects an individual's 
independence in making certain types of important 
decisions. 
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We considered and rejected a comparable claim in 
Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 
1991), where plaintiffs, a married couple, complained that 
a newspaper's disclosure of a police report of a violent 
domestic incident infringed on their decisional right to 
privacy because it chilled their right to seek marital 
counseling. Id. at 207 n.7. Likewise, the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit recognized a distinction between 
matter a statute directly regulates and the indirect effects 
its application may engender. In Sundquist, 106 F.3d at 
705-06, the court rejected the claim that a statute that 
permitted the disclosure of adoption records effected an 
infringement on "familial" or "reproductive" privacy. The 
court noted that the statute did not directly regulate when, 
how or by whom a child may be adopted, and hence found 
that it did not infringe upon the right to marry and raise 
children. Id. at 706. 
 
There are other examples of decisions sustaining statutes 
that may indirectly influence familial relationships. See, 
e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that 
government does not infringe a fundamental privacy 
interest by subsidizing childbirth but not abortion); Maher 
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (same); Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 
F.2d 898, 903-05 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that New Jersey 
statute did not infringe fundamental privacy right by 
imposing filing fee on divorce petitions); cf. Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding that state does not 
violate Equal Protection Clause by capping amount of grant 
under AFDC, regardless of family size); id. at 520 n.14 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (refusing to base analysis on claim 
that maximum grant regulation infringes fundamental right 
of procreation because "the effect of the . . . regulation 
upon the right . . . is marginal and indirect at best"). We 
put Megan's Law in the same category. 
 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that it was the 
actions of the plaintiffs that triggered application of Megan's 
Law. Whenever an individual commits a crime and is 
convicted and sentenced, the publicity will necessarily have 
an impact on the offender's family. Concededly, the 
registration and notification provisions of Megan's Law may 
evoke more publicity than usual, but that is the 
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consequence of the nature of the crime. We cannot 
conclude that this indirect effect is a violation of the 





During the pendency of this appeal, appellants filed a 
series of motions under seal, six in all, seeking to 
supplement the record with evidence of recent incidents 
which have caused serious adverse consequences to them 
and their families. In response, appellee Peter Verniero filed 
three motions to further supplement the record with 
evidence of the government's response to such unfortunate 
incidents. In light of our holding above, the material is not 
relevant to a determination of the issue before us-- 
whether Megan's Law's notification provisions violate 
plaintiffs' constitutional right to privacy. 
 
However, this court has previously held that "[t]he fact 
that protected information must be disclosed to a party who 
has a particular need for it . . . does not strip the 
information of its protection against disclosure to those who 
have no similar need," and we have required the 
government to implement adequate safeguards against 
unnecessary disclosure. Fraternal Order of Police, 812 F.2d 
at 118. Because these motions were filed in this court in 
the first instance, the District Court has not had the 
opportunity to consider the information contained therein 
and to determine whether any action is appropriate in light 
of our precedent. 
 
We note, for example, that at least one motion challenges 
the need for the scope of the community notification 
ordered, a challenge that may have some merit in light of a 
recent New Jersey decision on this issue. In In re Registrant 
R.F., No. A-6736-97T1, 1998 WL 925203, at *2 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1998), the New Jersey Superior Court, 
Appellate Division, stated that under Megan's Law"it is the 
prosecutor's burden to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence not only the degree of risk created by registrant's 
presence in the community, but also the scope of 
notification necessary to protect the members of the 
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community likely to encounter him." The court required the 
prosecutor to establish to a reasonable certainty that a Tier 
II offender was at "risk to attack young children in the 
vicinity of their schools and playgrounds" before notice 
could be sent to schools in the community. Id.  at *5 *6. 
 
Although we will deny the plaintiffs' motions to 
supplement and the corresponding motions by Verniero, we 
do so without prejudice and will remand this matter so that 
the District Court can consider whether plaintiffs' interest 
in assuring that information is disclosed only to those who 
have a particular need for it has been accorded adequate 





For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District 
Court's decision granting summary judgment for the State 
defendants on plaintiffs' claim that the notification 
provisions of Megan's law violate their constitutional right 
to privacy as a matter of law. However, in light of our 
conclusion that the material set forth in the subsequent 
motions filed in this court should be considered by the 
District Court in the first instance, we will remand this case 
to the District Court so that plaintiffs can file their motions 
and the District Court can consider such material in light 
of plaintiffs' challenge to the ways in which Megan's law is 
being applied. 
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FULLAM, District Judge, concurring. 
 
Solely because we are bound by the panel opinion in E.B. 
v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997), I concur in the 
majority's disposition of this appeal. I do so with great 
reluctance, however, because I agree in all respects with 
the dissenting opinion of Judge (now Chief Judge) Becker in 
E.B. As the material submitted to us under seal (and, 
indeed, the records in E.B. and other reported cases) 
demonstrate, the theoretical and "feel-good" benefits of 
Megan's Law may in the long run, be overwhelmed by the 
law's negative consequences. Statutes enabling, even 
perhaps encouraging, vigilantism and similar harms, seem 
utterly at odds with constitutional values. Perhaps an 
expanded record in the district court on remand may 
provide a basis for ameliorative measures. 
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